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The euro – more than just 
a currency 
Working together is worthwhile; growing together 
even more so. After more than 20 years of the single 
market and 15 years of monetary union, the members 
of the European Union – once referred to as the Euro-
pean Community – are interwoven. Indeed, they are 
very closely interconnected. Despite this, in the face of 
heated debates arising once again over a looming  
sovereign default by Greece, there is once again an  
uneasy feeling about having to pay up for the debts of 
other member states. In Germany, the largest contribu-
tor country, the willingness to act in solidarity is steadily 
decreasing. And this is despite the fact that Germany 
profits from the euro in many ways. Even in the  
country with the strongest economy, many are asking 
themselves whether this is the beginning of the end for 
the euro zone. 
 
The single market – a reliable partner for global  
competition 
Intra-EU trade is a two-way street. Other member states buy from German 
companies, and they also sell goods to German companies themselves. To 
be able to manufacture high-quality products, German companies need 
semi-finished goods, such as brake discs for the automobile industry. These 
are often imported from the Czech Republic. Plant manufacturers and the 
metal industry also use unprocessed goods from other European countries. 
Germany's chemical industry alone recently paid more than EUR 60 billion 
for semi-finished goods from other EU member countries. According to a 
study by Prognos AG – commissioned by the Bavarian Industry Association 
(VBW) – the value of unfinished goods from German industry in 2012 ran to 
USD 409 billion.  
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The same is true for Italy. Italy is interconnected with Germany and France, 
which are both important destinations for Italian machinery and transport 
equipment, chemicals, textiles and wine. France in turn finds customers in 
Germany, Belgium and Spain for its machinery and agricultural produce. But 
what about Germany? The German economy benefits from its neighbours 
because these countries appreciate the quality of German cars, power saws, 
assembly lines and tools. 
 
The citizens of Europe now take the smooth running of the single market for 
granted, every single day. They can buy mozzarella from Southern Italy in 
London, travel without a passport from Riga to Rome or move from Sala-
manca to Stuttgart for a well-paid job. 
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Interconnected added value – too closely integrated 
to go it alone  
It is easily forgotten that the interconnection of economic activity created dur-
ing decades of European integration is founded upon stable, well-functioning 
business models: tried and tested specialisation, which is not properly repre-
sented in the balance of payments and trade, since these are still only based 
upon national figures. The result is a false picture, which disregards the de-
pendence of jobs in one country on those in a neighbouring one. This sus-
tains an illusion that it is perfectly possible to go it alone. 
 
When German companies – winners of globalisation in so many ways – go 
shopping in Europe for semi-finished goods, they not only boost the balance 
sheets of their suppliers within the single market, but they create jobs in Eu-
rope at the same time. In Poland, there are some 600,000 jobs dependent 
on demand from Germany. In the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Ro-
mania, there are more than 300,000. Overall, German companies provide 
3.5 million jobs in EU countries and those jobs in turn generate demand, 
which Germany itself benefits from, according to the 2012 Prognos Study. 
 
So could Germany be likened to a locomotive drawing fuel from the wagons 
it is pulling along with it? That is fair to say, but the comparison goes further 
than that. Value chains are far less limited by national economic boundaries 
than they were before the euro was introduced. These chains extend across 
borders and are closely interconnected. Companies within the single market 
coordinate their business models and promote research, development and 
innovation together, as well as jointly developing new services. From an in-
ternational perspective, the reliability of these value chains, which have be-
come integrated over time, is not only seen as a clear advantage for German 
companies in terms of their location, but it attracts investment to Germany 
from all over the world.  
  
This means that the integration of value chains in the EU single market mo-
bilises global investment. As a result, Chinese investors happily rely on Ger-
many as the place from which to carry out business in Europe. South Amer-
ican countries also take advantage of this level of German economic integra-
tion. This is particularly true of Brazil, an emerging economy with a tradition 
of maintaining close links with German business partners. These links could 
be closer still. According to a study by the Bertelsmann Stiftung called “Brazil 
and Germany: A relationship in the 21st Century”, the two countries have 
numerous common interests. “If these were consistently pursued and coor-
dinated at government, institutional and investor levels, advantages for both 
sides in trade, technology and other areas would quickly become apparent". 
 
The European regions and the economic structures which have developed 
there have a direct impact on development and potential for cooperation be-
tween Europe and the rest of the world. The example of the North Rhine-
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Westphalia regional cluster, which is built around industrial materials, shows 
to what a great extent this region is dependent on an efficient connection with 
the docks of Antwerp and Rotterdam. This connection benefits not only the 
Netherlands and Belgium, but also has a direct impact on the economic and 
industrial policy agendas of regional political players.  
 
Taking all this into account, it is evident that Germany is a clear winner from 
the European single market. As a result of integration, German economic 
output increased by an average of EUR 37.1 billion per year between 1992 
and 2012. This is equivalent to additional average annual gains in income of 
EUR 450 per capita (see Bertelsmann Stiftung study “20 years of the Euro-
pean single market: growth effects of EU integration”). 
 
While the advantages arising from the European single market had already 
been analysed as far back as 1988 (“Cecchini report”) and there are figures 
to support them, the risks associated with a collapse of the market only be-
came clear during the global financial crisis of 2008 – 2009. And these risks 
have persisted since 2010 and the beginning of the euro crisis, creating 
chasms within the euro zone. 
The euro – the link to closer political integration 
The euro was once the crowning touch to European integration, but during 
the crisis it has developed into more of a divisive force than a unifying one. 
Fault lines between national economies have become clear and imbalances 
have come to light. Those economies in Southern Europe which are in need 
of reform and highly indebted are increasingly at risk of missing the oppor-
tunity to catch up with the dynamic economies of Northern Europe. Bail-outs 
have been set in place and guarantees given that the stragglers are to be 
given a hand. However, this has caused discontent across swathes of the 
European population. Most obviously, in the Southern European countries 
undergoing the reforms, where the economic crisis has brought great hard-
ship and left a whole generation bereft of a future. However, in Northern Eu-
ropean countries too, disillusionment is spreading. Germans yearn for a re-
turn to the Deutsche Mark. In the study “How Germany benefits from the euro 
in economic terms”, 65 per cent of respondents said that they would be better 
off today if Germany had retained the Deutsche Mark. Anxiety that in the end, 
it will be necessary to pay off other member states’ debts seems to generate 
a kind of nostalgic mirage: a false memory that everything used to be much 
better when each country had its own currency. 
 
But this nostalgia errs. The facts show that in Germany, growth of GDP in 
real terms would have been half a percentage point lower under the old cur-
rency. What is more, a return to the Deutsche Mark involves incalculable 
risks; the failure of the monetary union integration project would have a high-
risk impact on the functioning of the single market. To turn one's back on the 
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euro would be to play with fire, and this remains true even as the latest de-
velopments in the row over Greek debt seem to increase the temptation to 
do so. 
Protest parties in Europe – “The spirits I have  
summoned...” 
Since the political upheaval in Greece, a fierce debate has swept across Eu-
rope. This has unleashed dangerous political forces and European citizens 
now feel as if they are all sitting in the same, small boat. Across the board, 
citizens now have an interest in the political situation in other EU countries. 
They are becoming aware of the fact that what happens in Athens affects us 
all. Greece’s mountain of debt (EUR 320 billion) is borne by the euro zone. It 
is borne by the European Central Bank, the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) and the member states or quasi-state institutions, such as German 
development bank KfW. This therefore means that it is borne, de-facto, by 
the European taxpayer. These are debts which are borne jointly. Yet Greek 
Prime Minister Tsipras is demanding debt relief, that Greece go back on its 
austerity and reform promises and that the Troika be de-toothed. By doing 
so, he is putting at risk his country's place in the monetary union over the 
long term.  
 
The level of debt will leave him little room for manoeuvre. “A debt cut – and 
here we are not talking about a private debt cut, but about a debt cut by the 
public sector, that is, by the European governments – a debt cut of this kind 
would in fact create far more room for manoeuvre,” stated Henrik Enderlein 
in the latest edition of “flashlight Europe” (“Tsipras will have to put his cards 
on the table”, No. 1 January 2015). Concessions at this point are problematic 
and will require time, since there is no wish to “strengthen the left-wing or 
right-wing populist movements opposed to the euro zone in Spain, Italy or 
France by reaching an agreement with Syriza too fast and too soon," accord-
ing to Enderlein. 
 
It is true that opposition groups, such as the Five Star Movement and the 
Lega Nord in Italy and the new Spanish party PODEMOS have a close eye 
on the government in Athens. They believe that if the Euro Club compro-
mises with the Greeks it will open the door for demands from Spain, Portugal 
and Italy. Reform-minded governments presently in power would come un-
der pressure to justify sticking with austerity and reform. The modernisation 
process intended to help these countries become competitive would be 
called into question and with it, the economic dynamism which can be 
achieved through these reforms. 
  
06 
 
 
Z
u
k
u
n
ft
 S
o
z
ia
le
 M
a
rk
tw
ir
ts
ch
a
ft
 I
m
p
u
ls
e
 #
 2
0
1
5
/0
1
 
Economic governance for the euro zone – a political 
decision 
Since the beginning of the crisis, there has been a great deal of discussion 
and many decisions made. However, despite many positive developments, 
the underlying causes of imbalances between national economies, particu-
larly on the periphery of the euro-zone, have not yet been resolved. 
 
 
Everything which has been done so far has shown that “One size fits none” 
(Study “Repair and Prepare” by the Jacques Delors Institute – Berlin and the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung). Economic governance must be able to prevent crises, 
smooth out imbalances with the help of adjustment mechanisms and absorb 
external shocks. This can be achieved through a “modernisation pact”, in 
which the regions are taken sufficiently into account in economic and indus-
trial policy and which is supported by all euro-zone countries. For this reason, 
several amendments urgently need to be made to economic governance in 
the euro zone. Incentives and sanctions need to be proportionate. Member 
states’ fiscal policies need to be more closely coordinated.  
 
However, it will take time before a step towards modernisation of this kind 
can be made. Not only because individual euro zone countries are blocking 
it, but also as the necessary steps, e. g. setting up a European Monetary 
Fund with the know-how to help deal with crises, will require changes to EU 
treaties. At the present time, renegotiating the treaties would be akin to open-
ing Pandora’s Box. Since the European Parliament elections in May, political 
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decision-making procedures, which were already complicated enough, have 
become even more so.   
 
Following that election, alongside Christian and social democrats, greens 
and liberals, there are also larger numbers of right-wing populists, right-wing 
extremists, pro-traditional family politicians, EU sceptics and anti-euro MEPs, 
sitting in the parliament. Alongside Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom from the 
Netherlands, there are right-wing conservatives from Poland who consider 
women’s suffrage an idiotic idea. Italian comic Beppe Grillo with his Five Star 
Movement, who prefers to manage his supporters via Twitter and Facebook, 
is also represented. They are flanked by MEPs from the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP). Party leader Nigel Farage has succeeded in 
making his anti-integration forces into “an integral part of the mainstream”. At 
home in Great Britain, UKIP “is not only at the centre of British debate. It also 
leads it.” (spotlight europe, “The Populist Networks” May 2014). Yet another 
strand is represented by Marine Le Pen’s National Front, which has a ten-
dency to drive its national agenda via Europe.   
 
The march of the euro sceptics, who benefit from the pain of the adjustments 
being made in the debtor countries and the discontent in Northern European 
countries, has made it an uphill struggle every time a majority in the Euro-
pean Parliament has been required. In order to be able to make decisions of 
any kind, a de facto grand coalition has emerged, with the European People’s 
Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) 
often pulling together. This means the anti-European parties remain without 
a decisive influence. However, the Greeks stubborn move away from reform 
and their revocation of all previous agreements is darkening the mood. 
Voices against the euro are be-coming louder and are calling for their coun-
tries to leave the euro. 
Repair and prepare – for an improved and reformed 
monetary union 
The euro is not an end in itself, rather it greases the gears of the single market 
and a Europe unfettered by lines on a map. It presents an opportunity for 
member states to create economic interconnections and net-works for the 
good of their own citizens. Only within the euro can Northern European coun-
tries shape the future and indebted countries catch up – as long as they un-
derstand that they have to orient their business model to-wards competitive-
ness. Growth is only possible by way of this common market. And Europe 
needs growth and a dynamism in keeping with the economic area. If deftly 
drawn up, the investment package from President of the Commission, Jean-
Claude Juncker, could take a further step to-wards the deeper integration of 
the single market, particularly with respect to the markets for capital and ser-
vices. Investment in future-oriented training and education, efficient health 
services, interconnected energy markets and swift digitalisation are essential 
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for more dynamic growth in productivity, all along the value chain in our so-
ciety. Only by improving global competitiveness can we create and safeguard 
jobs for future generations. However, a necessary condition for this is that 
Europe’s investors are also involved and not only public funds but also pri-
vate funding can be mobilised. This requires trust – not only between the 
euro partners but also from the financial markets – in a currency that despite 
all its successes has not yet proved its durability.  
 
“This confounded game with Greece” as the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Sonntagszeitung recently put it, is a game with an uncertain outcome, both 
for the Greeks and for their European partners. Every crack in the euro zone 
is loaded with risk and threatens the existence of the monetary union. If we 
wish to maintain the euro zone, we need to have a discussion over debt man-
agement, an insolvency procedure for member states, a functioning banking 
union and instruments to prevent imbalances in the euro zone. And we need 
a just amount of solidarity, which enables member states to help themselves. 
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